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Abstract 
We address the centrality of affect in structuring social practices, including those of 
organizing and managing.  Social practices, it is argued, are contingent upon actors’ 
affectively charged involvement in immanent, yet indeterminate social relations.  To 
understand this generative involvement, we commend a temporally-sensitive, critically-
oriented theoretical framework, grounded in an affect-based ontology of practice. We 
demonstrate the relevance and credibility of this proposal through an analysis of the 
interactions of Board members in a UK consulting company. 
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The significance of affect, including emotion, is rarely registered or appreciated in practice-
theoretic analyses of the social world (e.g. Sandberg and Tsoukas, 2011). Where practice is 
acknowledged to be affectively charged (e.g. Lok and de Rond, 2013), the possibility that 
‘affect affects’ practices is ‘seen but unnoticed’ (Garfinkel, 1967). Affect is pervasive, yet it 
remains largely unthematised in social and organizational analysis. In this paper, we seek to 
demonstrate and draw out the critical and empirical implications of paying direct attention to 
affect in accounting for the social structuring of practice(s). We are especially interested in 
  
the unfolding relationship between affect and the ‘basic grammar(s) within which possible 
objects are constituted’, and which ‘mediates any kind of contact with reality’ (Bhaskar and 
Laclau, 1998: 9). This grammar, which Laclau also terms ‘discourse’, is conceived to be 
‘largely unconscious…so the task of the discourse analyst is to explore the immanent 
grammars which underlie all kinds of meaningful intervention’ (Laclau, 1998: 9). 
Specifically, we seek to disclose the affectively-driven operation of ‘unconscious… 
immanent grammars’, or discourses – such as those enacted by directors of an IT consultancy 
that we analyse later.  In addressing affect’s significance in the (re)production of mundane 
organizational work, we engage an analytical framework developed by the ‘Essex school’ of 
discourse analysis. Initiated by Laclau (e.g. Laclau and Mouffe, 1985), the Essex school is 
distinguishable from other schools of discourse analysis in its (postfoundationalist) 
conception of the ‘structural undecidability’ (Laclau, 1995: 93) of the social.  In this view, 
‘ontic’ social relations and schemas which may appear superficially settled and permanent are 
actually constituted provisionally, and moment by moment, from their unfolding relationship 
with the ‘ontological’: an invisible but limitless ‘open universe’ of possibility comprised of  
‘immanent grammars’. A major research challenge associated with this approach is to 
disclose how this ‘ontological’ register is significant in shaping the ‘ontic’ register – an 
analytic challenge that faces all social scientific research endeavours which presume the 
influence and significance of invisible ‘structures’ (e.g. social and psychoanalytical) upon 
empirically observable ‘actions’.  
Our analysis deploys Glynos and Howarth’s (2007, 2008) Logics of critical explanation 
(hereafter Logics) in which the ‘ontic’ and ‘ontological’ registers are juxtaposed dialectically 
(Laclau, 2000: 58). Our study thus adds to a nascent body of work in which Logics has 
informed empirical analysis (e.g. Wagenaar, 2011; West, 2011; Glynos, Klimecki and 
Willmott, 2012; in press; Glynos, Speed and West, 2014). The Logics framework facilitates 
  
consideration of what may be happening in each of these registers, and guides analysis of the 
possible socially generative relationship between the two: a relationship which animates 
Laclau’s ‘structural undecidability’. At the heart of the ontological-ontic dialectic is actors’ 
ongoing affective identification with practices, and their associated behaviour in reproducing, 
defending, or challenging these, which constitutes this undecidable ‘trace of contingency 
within the structure’ (Laclau, 1993: 535). For researchers who reject the assumptions of 
empirical realism but do not subscribe to some version of critical realism, attending to this 
‘trace’ of ontological contingency is an important analytical undertaking. While the various 
ontic manifestations of power, for example, are more or less identifiable to the researcher 
(Lukes, 1974), their ontological contingency is, at best, only partially acknowledged; social 
configurations thus may appear more self-evident and stable than really they are. 
An affect-based ontology of practice, guided by a Laclauian framework, is directly 
attentive to the presence and significance of the underlying ontological contingency of power 
relations.  The framework shows how social relations are immanently conditioned by actors’ 
affective states and associated identifications and dis-identifications – and thus attends to the 
mutually constitutive, and analytically revealing, relationship between affect and power in 
organisational practice.  In the following section of the paper, we locate our analysis 
primarily within practice-based studies and research on affect. Next, we outline the Logics 
approach (Glynos and Howarth, 2007, 2008) in which an affective ontology is combined with 
an attentiveness to unfolding power relations in organisational practice. Notably, the 
framework incorporates psychoanalytic insights to disclose the potency of affectively-
charged fantasies in the animation of social practices. In the third section, we illustrate and 
elaborate this insight through an analysis of two episodes drawn from a study of Board 
interactions in an IT consulting firm, Associates. We conclude that an affect-based ontology 
of practice holds potentially radical implications for social/organizational theoretical 
  
development. Most broadly, it highlights shortcomings in forms of social and organizational 
analysis that are solely attentive to the ontic register.  We will show instead how a central 
focus on the generative tension between ontic and ontological registers allows researchers to 
better appreciate and address the socially productive significance of the ‘politics of affect’. 
Locating and orienting our research  
The literature addressing aspects of affect is extensive, so we rely here upon a number of 
recent reviews, the most salient of which, for our purposes, are Brief and Weiss (2002); 
Fineman (1993); Elfenbein (2007); Schmidt and Gibson (2010); Simpson and Marshall 
(2010); and Voronov and Vince (2012). The assessment is that, as a consequence of the 
dominance of variants of rationalism, affect has generally tended to be marginalized in social 
scientific analysis, including management and organization studies (for recent discussions, 
see Collins and Munro, 2010; Hynes, 2013). In this inauspicious context, the challenge is to 
appreciate how, as Barbalet (2001: 187, emphasis added) puts it, with regard to the study of 
emotion as a form of affect, 
 
Emotion, as movement, is in that sense both external to the subject who experiences it 
and integral to their being as a consequence of their being moved by the feeling. 
Emotion has a source outside of the self in its relations with others and is internally 
experienced as a function of active being. It is through the subject's active exchanges 
with others, through interaction, that emotional experience is both stimulated in the 
actor and orientating of their conduct. 
 
Our approach to the study of affect is consistent with Barbalet’s conception of emotion 
as ‘movement’ that is experienced by actors as ‘a function of active being’ but is stimulated 
by ‘relations with others’ and, crucially, is ‘orienting of their conduct’. Accordingly, it is 
appropriate to locate our study of affect within approaches that comprise the ‘practice turn’ 
  
(for reviews, see Corradi et al. 2008; Nicolini (2012); see also Gherardi, 2009; Jansson, 2013; 
King, 2009; Lave and Wenger, 1991). Briefly, we distinguish core contributions to the 
practice canon by reference to their central commitment: first, to a process-based ontology of 
continual ‘becoming’ (Thompson, 2011; Tsoukas and Chia, 2002); and second, to an 
epistemology that, by addressing the evolving accountability of practice (Rouse, 2001), 
attends to how behaviours, actions, and understandings of social acceptability (and thus 
contestability) are context-driven and become intelligible to selves and others ‘in flight’. As 
noted by Wetherell and others (e.g. Stenner, 2009; Walkerdine, 2009), practice ‘offers the 
best, bare bones, synthesising rubric for research on affect’ (Wetherell, 2012: 11), where 
‘analyses of affective practices…will take as their subject how these practices are situated 
and connected’ (Wetherell, 2012: 13).  As we shall show, our intersubjective (rather than 
subjective) conception of affect is similarly intertwined and relational, and so invites a view 
of practice as a medium and outcome of relations of power. 
The focus of our study is upon an ‘immanent logic of practice’ (Chia and MacKay, 
2007: 219, italics omitted) whereby ‘unconscious social forces shape and direct human 
intentions and actions’ (Chia and MacKay, 2007: 232).  This conception of practice owes 
much to the immanence of Heidegger’s Dasein (which includes affective disposition as a 
core component) in attending to how, unconsciously, ‘cultural transmissions, socialization, 
institutionalization, disciplinary regimes, etc., play a crucial role in shaping an actor’s modus 
operandi’ (Chia and MacKay, 2007: 232, original italics).  We depart, however, from Chia 
and Mackay (2001) in our focus on the ‘psychosocial texture’ (Wetherell, 2012: 2) of this 
immanent logic, entailing a more encompassing conception of affect as ‘a philosophy of 
force, becoming, potential, encounter and difference’ that has ‘influence, intensity and 
impact’ (Wetherell, 2012: 3), where affect is defined as ‘embodied meaning-making’ 
(Wetherell, 2012: 4). Our study is also distinguishable from ‘psychological’ approaches to 
  
affect, in which affective states (specific moods and emotions) tend to be abstracted from 
their social context.  
In focusing on the psychosocial texture of this immanent logic of practice, our study 
has much in common with research located within the NW quadrant of Sieben and 
Wettergren’s (2010) ‘mapping’ of affect studies.  This quadrant combines the critical, post-
functionalist aim of politicising, rather then maintaining, existing relations, with a 
local/emergent approach that seeks to surface and illuminate dynamics of practice without 
being methodologically preoccupied with replicability or generalizability. The overriding 
concern of scholarship in this quadrant is with exploring the linkages between the ‘power-
knowledge connection’ and the ‘embodiment’ of emotion (Sieben, 2007: 572). 
 
Logics as a conceptual framework  
Social, political, and fantasmatic logics 
In addressing the tricky issue of researching and conveying the social situatedness of others’ 
affective states - a challenge which is perhaps most obvious in the study of ‘atmospheres’ 
(Anderson, 2009) – we deploy Glynos and Howarth’s (2008) Logics framework. In Logics, a 
focus on discourse, in the ontic register, is combined with a (Lacanian) attentiveness to 
affective dynamics in the ontological register (Fotaki et al., 2012; see also Žĭzek, 1989; 
Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; Cederström and Spicer, 2013). Consistent with an affect-based 
ontology, Glynos and Howarth argue that the reproduction or transformation of social 
practices arises from the operation of three interweaving logics: social, political and 
fantasmatic.  
Social logics rationalize and reproduce the status quo. Political logics, in contrast, 
operate to establish new practices as well as to transform practices in the face of the 
naturalizing effects of prevailing social logics. Most importantly for our analysis, fantasmatic 
  
logics provide the motivational force for processes of reproduction and transformation 
through affective identification with, and investment in, particular grammars/discourse. In 
supplying the psychosocial texture animating actors’ affective motivations, fantasmatic logics 
frame and mediate actors’ identification, and resulting mode (or immanent logic) of 
engagement, with unfolding practice.   
 
Fantasmatic logics mediate actors’ mode of engagement 
Unlike other framings of affective self-identification, such as those devised by Bourdieu (e.g. 
1977) and Giddens (e.g. 1984), the Logics framework’s affect-based ontology of practice (see 
Kemp, 2010; Thompson, 2012) accords central importance to the operation of this third, 
fantasmatic, logic. This approach involves a shift from examining specific (ontic) ‘practices’ 
towards a focal attentiveness to actors’ (ontological) mode of engagement: how actors 
reproduce or challenge social relations as they become affectively invested in, or distanced 
from, those relations (Glynos and Stavrakakis, 2008).  
In theorising the mode of engagement, Glynos and Howarth (2007) adopt a Lacanian 
view of fantasmatic logics as deriving from libidinally felt motivation directed towards 
jouissance: a form of enjoyment-in-anticipation, the object of which can never be obtained:  
‘jouissance does not exist, it is impossible, but it produces a number of traumatic effects’ 
(Žĭzek, 1989: 164). These ‘effects’ manifest via fantasy: actors’ subscription to 
identifications that ‘paper over’ the contingency of social life (Lok and Willmott, 2013), and 
distract/compensate for the (traumatic) unattainability of jouissance. In short, in accounting 
for the ‘grip’ of identity on the ‘vector’ of possible identifications (Glynos and Stavrakakis, 
2008: 11; see also Glynos and Stavrakakis, 2008) fantasy mediates between affective 
motivation and socio-political reality, via the mode of engagement (Glynos and Stavrakakis, 
2008: 8; see also Frosh, 2002). Subjects’ willingness to conform with ideologies and 
  
identities with which they are confronted is understood to depend on the extent to which 
jouissance associated with fantasies encourages them to disregard their underlying 
contingency/unattainability. To the extent that this occurs, ‘domination…differs from [mere] 
authority and oppression in that agents are complicit in their acceptance of structures and 
practices that from the critic’s point of view can be judged illegitimate or unjust’ (Glynos, 
2010: 323) – leading potentially to self-exploitation (e.g. Costas and Fleming, 2009). 
 
Using dimensions of the Logics to study psychosocial configurations  
Drawing together the discussion of Logics, the horizontal dimension in Figure 1 is concerned 
with how ‘fantasmatic dynamics’ mediate ‘ethical and ideological forms of subjectivity’ 
(Ekman, 2013: 1161, original italics), and the vertical dimension addresses the social 
‘consequences’ of this unfolding process in terms of maintaining and/or transforming social 
practices. Taking each in turn, the horizontal (‘naturalization’) axis addresses the differential 
ways in which actors experience and address contingency: ‘the ideological logic involves a 
subject struggling with competing hyper-intense fantasies, whereas the ethical logic involves 
a subject struggling with her or his tendency to fantasize at all’ (Glynos, 2008: 291, in 
Ekman, 2013: 1165) because s/he recognises the underlying contingency/contestability of 
these identifications, and thus resists ‘buying in’ to them. 
-------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
-------------------------------------------- 
Turning to the vertical (‘contestation’) axis, at the ‘social’ pole, practices are 
reproduced with the minimum of contestation. At the ‘political’ pole however, practices are 
in the process of being instituted or challenged. As will become evident, the strongest 
affinities are between the ethical-political (disinvestment-challenge) poles, and also between 
  
the ideological-social (investment-acquiescence) poles. Of direct relevance for analysis that 
has an emancipatory intent, as exemplified by Logics, the ethical pole underscores the 
ontological contingency of local (ontic) practices that may otherwise appear ideologically 
self-evident or normative, and it thereby provides the conditions of possibility of critique. It 
particularly invites (political) consideration of forms of self-regulation, in the form of the 
affective vulnerabilities to which subjects become exposed through their participation in 
fantasmatic logics, to the extent that identify with, and thus replicate, ontic practices. 
 
Applying the logics 
Having the benefit of, but also departing from, previous attempts to operationalize the Logics 
framework (e.g. Clarke, 2011; Ekman, 2013; Holtzman, 2013), we now demonstrate its 
relevance for the empirical study of affect in the social structuring of practice. Consideration 
of the naturalization and contestation dimensions together can, we will suggest, illuminate the 
mediating operation of (affectively-felt) fantasmatic logics on both social logics 
(reproduction) and political logics (institution/transformation) (see Figure 2). 
-------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
-------------------------------------------- 
Working round Figure 2, subjects’ fantasmatic identifications can obscure the 
contingency of social life (left side of Figure 2); or, to the extent that people are less 
affectively invested in, and therefore less dependent upon these identifications, there is 
greater openness to, and awareness of, the underlying contingency/contestability of social 
relations (right side of Figure 2). In this regard, actors are more favourably placed to act in 
ways that challenge those relations, or they are actively quiescent in their reproduction (they 
don’t ‘buy in’, but they don’t challenge, either).  Conversely, to the extent that subjects are 
  
affectively invested in, and subject to, fantasmatic identifications, awareness of the 
contingency/contestability of normative relations of power is less likely, and so there is a 
greater propensity passively to reproduce those relations. Alternatively, actors may attempt to 
supplant established relations with another set of relations in which they are affectively 
invested.  
Our analysis works outwards, identifying actors’ (mediating) affective fantasmatic 
logics which we link to social and political logics along the two dimensions discussed above. 
Within our affect-based ontology of practice, the Logics framework facilitates analysis of 
how the conversations reported in fragments of our transcript presented below develop 
through several identifiable, if temporary, configurations of affectively-mediated logics.   
 
Research context 
Shared narratives at Associates: Will, Andy, and the researcher 
The site of the research is a well-established mid-sized Metropolis-based consulting company 
which we call Associates (a pseudonym). At the time of the research, conducted in 2010, the 
company had been undergoing internal restructuring, as well as developing new propositions 
and capabilities in response to the post-2008 economic downturn. Will, Andy (the names are 
pseudonyms), and one of the authors (hereafter ‘the Researcher’) were all directors of the 
company, and had been attending Board meetings together since 2005.  Notes were taken by 
the Researcher (who has 20 years’ immersion in Associates) on the interactions between Will 
and Andy that occurred during three monthly Board meetings (August-November 2010) from 
which two vignettes are presented here. Due to the shared history between Will, Andy and 
the Researcher, the unfolding meaning for the participants of the two episodes is only 
partially intelligible in the present tense. That is because, as Middleton and Brown (2005: 
224) note, ‘[t]ime does not break for us into tiny segments.  Our duration is a continuous 
  
gnawing of the past into the present where the present is infused with a burden of the past that 
does not pass, does not ever escape us’. 
It will be argued that Will, Andy and the Researcher are all fantasmatically invested in 
the preservation of self-identities that have become defined, and are reaffirmed, through their 
interactions.  Will and the Researcher had worked for the Company since its startup days. 
Andy, in contrast, had gained experience working in a larger consulting organization before 
joining Associates more recently. To provide additional details of Will and Andy’s 
backgrounds is neither morally defensible nor practically relevant as this might allow their 
identification. Through our analysis of the vignettes, we show how the fantasmatic logics of 
the actors’ respective self-investments mediated their mode of engagement, which we 
examine in terms of the four dimensions of social relations (Figure 1).  
In order to interpret the vignettes, it is relevant to provide some background about the 
self-identities of the three board members. The following terms speak to Will’s self-identity 
in the context of Associates: ‘leader, ‘considerate’, ‘straight talking’, and ‘people person’. 
Those central to Andy’s self-identity include ‘leader’ but also ‘ambitious’, ‘corporate’, and 
‘professional’. Finally, those describing the Researcher’s self-identity include ‘mediator’, 
‘analytical’, and ‘reticent’.  Taken together, Andy’s self-identifications might be collectively 
termed ‘managerialist’, Will’s might be termed ‘empathetic’, and the Researcher’s ‘non-
committal’, in the sense that he often tried to avoid identifying with what he regarded as 
Will’s or Andy’s generally more dominant and rigid schemas (in Logics terms, it could be 
said that the Researcher tried semi-consciously to locate himself in the SE quadrant in Figure 
2). Of course, it is to be emphasised that these are attributions of self-identity made by the 
Researcher, albeit that they are based upon many years of experience in interacting with Will 
and Andy. 
  
In the Researcher’s assessment, all three directors harboured and occasionally displayed 
some awareness of the others’ self-identifications, which appeared to have influenced the 
evolution of their own respective self-identities, as well as group identity over the years, in a 
way that is intelligible only historically and relationally. The affective politics between Will, 
Andy, and the Researcher, which are evident in the vignettes, had been co-created, over time, 
in a manner that exemplifies the progressive ‘intertwining of subjectivities’ between self and 
others as ‘we observe their gestures, facial expressions, their rising and dampening of affect 
and then model, intuit and re-run their intentions and psychological states’ (Wetherell 2012: 
88). In our analysis, we attempt to ‘model, intuit and re-run’ this affective relationality. 
 
Interpreting shared narratives: Collection and analysis of data 
The method of data collection was covert (Goffman, 1968; Jorgensen, 1989) so as to 
minimise the Researcher’s influence on the ‘natural’ unfolding of the interactions. The 
questionable ethics of such covert participant observation have also been selectively defended 
(eg. Herrera, 1999; Lugosi, 2006; Miller 2001), with some experienced ethnographers 
conceding that all fieldwork relationships invariably involve some covertness (e.g. Grills, 
1998). In the present study, the texts and supporting analysis were subsequently shared with 
relevant members of Associates, and consent to publication obtained. Despite this consent, 
which could also be portrayed as member ‘validation’, our analysis is, inescapably, 
selectively attentive to the interactions comprising the episodes. It necessarily presents a 
perspective-dependent version of ‘the truth’, but one whose frame of reference we have 
endeavoured to make explicit. 
If Adler and Adler’s (1987) advice that data collection continues until one can ‘act as a 
native’, then saturation has resulted from the Researcher’s extended period of immersion in 
the field. Such immersion is especially valuable for analysis where close familiarity with 
  
subjects’ emotional orientations is required. Specifically, and with regard to the approach 
advanced here, it is vital to have an in-depth and longitudinal appreciation of the affectivity 
of fantasmatic logics in relation to the social logics and political logics enacted in the 
research setting. In presenting our analysis, we readily acknowledge that the empirical 
‘evidence’ underpinning our attributions exists in the ontic, rather than ontological, register, 
and for this reason we have separated the two registers in our analysis of the data.   
Earlier we appealed to the value of ‘immersion’, the cri de coeur of all participant 
researchers. In our analysis, the claims we make beg the question of how researchers can 
access other peoples’ emotions. To address this tricky issue, we refer to Sturdy’s (2003) 
consideration of research on emotion where he contends that ‘given some cultural 
understanding of the immediate social context, we can necessarily offer a valid or plausible 
interpretation of sentiments through observation’. Sturdy further argues that ‘immediate and 
biographical history…may provide insight into the emotional context and process’ (2003: 86-
7).  An ability to ‘read’ and evaluate affect in the form of others’ emotions is, on this 
interpretation, a basic social competency for organizational practice (as demonstrated in its 
breach), in which working familiarity with the discursive practice through which emotions 
are constituted is substituted for the more traditional concern with elusive ‘inner feelings’.  
This methodological stance resonates strongly with the view that: 
 
The emotionality of narrative is more than the location of certain emotion words and 
phrases. It includes the relationship between the words, the metaphors used… and the 
sense of cadence, hesitation and silences detectable in the structure of the text or 
presentation (tape recording, video or observations). The researcher’s challenge is 
sensitively to ‘read’ the emotional form and context of the text, while accentuating what 
is important for the particular inquiry. In doing so, the researcher is inevitably a part of 
  
the process, drawing upon emotion discourses ‘in their head’. Such reflexivity is a 
feature of emotion knowing (Fineman, 2004: 733). 
 
In this sense, the analysis and commentary provided by the Researcher below is a 
response to the challenge ‘sensitively to “read” the emotional form and context of the text’ 
while recognising that ‘the researcher is inevitably part of the process, drawing upon 
emotional discourse “in their head”’.  The analysis is partly a ‘confessional tale’ (Van 
Maanen, 1988), a form of ‘[m]ethodological reflexivity, as expressed in confessional 
ethnography, [which] transforms the self by converting it to a new way of thinking and acting 
and writing – that way being the way of introspective reflection’ (Webster, 2008: 68) that is 
sensitive to the ‘relationships’ to which Fineman (2004) refers. 
 
Empirical material 
Two episodes from the Board meetings are presented and analysed below. Each was selected 
for its relatively self-contained and accessible (e.g. jargon-free) nature, and both are 
sufficiently brief to allow their presentation within the space limitations of a journal article. 
Our intention in analysing the two episodes, or vignettes, is primarily to demonstrate the 
social potency of affect for the structuring of social practice – in this case, the mundane 
practice that comprise board deliberations. To this end, we apply and demonstrate the Logics 
approach to make a case for an affect-based ontology of practice. This aim is consistent with 
an acknowledgment that qualitative case studies ‘typically ha[ve] more relevance to 
theoretical generalisation, which involves “suggesting new interpretations and concepts or re-
examining earlier concepts or interpretations in new and innovative ways”’ (Orum et al., 
1991: 13). In our analysis of the episodes, we aspire to attain some degree of ‘naturalistic 
generalisability’ (Stake, 1978), at least insofar as its aspiration is to resonate with our readers’ 
own sensemaking.  
  
Engaging with the empirical material 
Our analysis examines two exchanges between Will and Andy (see Episodes 1 and 2).  The 
use of a tabular format permits the exchanges to be read vertically in the form that they 
occurred, as well as horizontally in dialogue with our suggested configuration of Logics, 
whilst maintaining a clear separation between the two. The left hand column sets out the 
exchanges as they were recorded in the Researcher’s field notes.  The notes comprise the 
exchanges as they were spoken, and emotional cues that were observed [square brackets], 
together with observations about ‘atmospheres’ that were affectively experienced by the 
Researcher (round brackets). These observations take the form of single adjectives, in 
brackets in the left hand column of the Table for each episode, that describe how the room 
felt to the Researcher in a way that parallels others’ descriptions of affective ‘atmospheres’ 
conceived inter alia as ‘spatially discharged, quasi-objective feelings’ (Böhme, 2006: 16), 
‘collective affects’ (Anderson, 2009: 78), or contagious affect (Thrift, 2008). These 
observations may be casually termed ‘subjective’, but consistent with the conceptual framing 
of this paper, they are arguably inter-subjective in their embodied sociality. 
The right hand column locates our analysis within the Logics framework: it offers 
‘snapshots’ of the different configurations of the three logics through which we argue that the 
dialogue passes as it unfolds (these are also marked on Figure 2 as ‘Will 1’, ‘Andy 1’, etc).  
Finally, the analysis that follows each Episode has been written by the Researcher, and the 
narrative therefore moves into the first person where it has a more confessional style.  This 
analytical approach, we suggest, offers a novel and promising, affect-attentive way to 
explicate the dynamics of everyday practices of organizing.   
-------------------------------------------- 
INSERT EPISODE 1 HERE 
-------------------------------------------- 
  
Episode 1: Organizational structure 
When interpreted within the Logics framework, the above episode is seen to move through 
several psychosocial articulations.  In the first, ‘Regard of contingency: knowing challenge 
(invocation of political logic)’, there is a configuration of political and ethical dimensions 
(recalling Figure 2) as Andy introduces the notion of stronger governance structures. This is 
an innovation that the Researcher believes Andy anticipates will be difficult, since it 
challenges the status quo (political logic). It invokes a long-standing difference, where Andy 
seeks more formality, and Will seeks informality.  ‘Company Handbook’ is therefore a 
loaded phrase; its invocation creates a tension in the room that the Researcher believes was 
strongly felt by all who were present.  Such a tension is intelligible as an ‘intention 
movement’ (Stern, 2004).  Such movements are 
 
not completed relational moves but mere beginnings of recognisable affective patterns.  
These seem like the moments preceding lightning strikes when sophisticated still 
photography shows threads of electrical connection beginning to manifest with the 
tallest objects in the field, before the strike completes the connection (Wetherell, 2012: 
87). 
 
Andy’s introduction of the ‘Company Handbook’ [Andy 1] immediately invokes a 
historically-inflected, affective positioning: a specific configuration of power relations over 
which Andy has discursive mastery.  Fantasmatically, the Researcher’s everyday, operational 
reading of Andy is that he is invested in a more corporate self-image in which ‘moral’ 
signifiers like governance structures make him feel confident/in control, whereas Will is 
invested in the reverse – and the apparent bipolarity of this dynamic may be exacerbated by 
the Researcher’s (felt and perceived) passivity. In turn, it may be that the Researcher is 
  
invested fantasmatically in the notion of being a ‘moderate’ in relation to Will and Andy’s 
‘excessive posturing’.  For all three, these characterisations are historically-forged and 
evident in occasional tacit acknowledgements of mutual difference, and this tripartite ‘shape’ 
colours the way in which each board member is motivated to react, and experience the 
immanent structuring of their practices.  When interpreted within the Logics framework, the 
motivations of each board member are seen to arise from their respective pursuit of 
jouissance: each wishes to ‘feel good’: secure, and confident, about their positioning within 
the tripartite dynamic that routinely impedes and subverts this possibility.  Re-visiting this 
sequence, and the ‘tense’ note in brackets, is to reconstitute a keen relationality: a viscerally-
experienced patterning of mutual insecurity: of discursive move and counter-move in which 
the Researcher often occupied the position of despairing bystander. 
In the second articulation, ‘Regard of contingency: attempt to reproduce status quo 
(invocation of social logic)’, a single sound [Will 1] from Will is sufficient to convey rich 
meaning to the Researcher and Andy: his noncommittal ‘Mmmmmm’ response indicates that 
he is listening, that Andy may have a point (i.e. that Will’s own position may be contingent) 
but he does not agree anyway (attempt to reproduce status quo). Fantasmatically, Will 
appears emotionally invested in a ‘straight-talking’ and ‘reasonable’ self-image, which pits 
him against Andy’s bid to position the Company Handbook as a self-evidently obvious 
improvement (in Will’s view, such structures are poor substitutes for ‘getting in a room and 
sorting things out face to face’) – motivating him to invoke a social logic (reproduction of 
existing relations).  
All three directors are highly sensitive to topics, such as the Handbook, which are 
emblematic of, and so immediately trigger, an historically-embedded conflict: the 
psychodynamics of their/our interaction are bound up in the ‘tinderbox’ of our mutual 
discursive patterning. In this articulation, Will’s positioning combines social and ethical 
  
dimensions of the Logics, where he is ‘ethically aware’ of Andy’s discursive move, but is 
reserving his position for now.  Will’s ‘Mmmmmm’ indicates that he is feeling frustrated at 
the direction this conversation may be about to take – at the likely effect that his ‘regard of 
contingency’ is likely to have on Andy in a moment’s time – even as he utters the sound. 
In the third articulation - Disregard of contingency: semi-conscious 
identification/challenge (defence of political logic) - Will’s noncommittal response ignites 
feelings of frustration and hostility in Andy (and a similarly frustrated sense of ‘been-here-
before’ in the Researcher – as indicated by the margin note ‘aarrgghhhh’).  Andy moves to a 
political/ideological configuration of dimensions, since fantasmatically his self-image seems 
bound up with his role as professional innovator, with experience of professional best 
practice, gained prior to joining Associates, that neither Will nor the Researcher possess 
(whilst allowing that this may be a partial reflection of a certain insecurity on the 
Researcher’s part).  In the terms used here, it appears to the Researcher that the notion of 
being professionally ‘in control’ is a source of jouissance for Andy.  Reflection on this 
encounter usually reconstitutes feelings of sympathy that the Researcher felt at the time for 
Andy, because he often appeared less aware of these dynamics than Will. That is to say, he 
seemed to operate more often than Will towards the ‘ideological’ pole of the ‘naturalization’ 
axis – with an attendant vulnerability when the contingency of schemas with which he 
identified came under challenge.   
The Researcher’s reading of Andy’s ‘sigh’, and related vocal tone in [Andy 2] is that he 
is aware of the significance of this particular skirmish both for his own self-esteem and for 
the deeply embedded power relations between him and Will (i.e. there is an air of resignation 
to some inevitability about their interaction). Recalling that Andy has mastery of this 
particular ‘grammar’, discursive closure around the signifiers of ‘good governance’ 
represented by the Handbook offers him the prospect of ontological security.  However, 
  
Andy’s frustrated demeanour may betray an awareness that satisfaction of this ‘lack’ in the 
form of ‘ontic closure’ – turning this contingency into local reality - is contingent upon Will’s 
ethical value-choice, as well as his own – in a manner recalling Žĭzek’s comment, earlier, 
about the trauma associated with the unachievability of jouissance. 
Will’s response in the fourth articulation - Disregard of contingency: semi-conscious 
identification/challenge (defence of social logic) – appears to reinforce the precariousness of 
Andy’s position. Will responds [Will 2] to Andy’s sigh with a strained, terse tone of voice 
(both seem to strive to maintain neutral body language), betraying some semi-conscious 
awareness that there is more at stake than the subject of this particular exchange - an 
awareness which mirrors that of Andy, and certainly the Researcher’s own (indeed, the three 
are relationally constituted).  Will now justifies his position and makes clear why he 
disagrees with Andy (‘ideological’ and ‘political’ dimensions), as he shores up his persona as 
a ‘people person’.  He appeals to an alternative discursive grammar: ‘that magic’ (Associates’ 
traditionally friendly culture), and thus the self-evidence of not ‘throw(ing) the baby out with 
the bathwater’.  As an observer who shares Will and Andy’s historically-established affective 
patterning and ‘embodied meaning-making’ (Wetherell, 2012: 4), it is evident to the 
Researcher from the simmering atmosphere in the room that this skirmish has become much 
more about Will and Andy’s ‘empathetic’ vs ‘managerialist’ positioning, than any 
comparatively innocuous debate regarding the relative efficacy of a Corporate Handbook. 
Finally, by the fifth articulation - Regard of contingency: knowing challenge (defence of 
political logic) - the neutral body language studiously maintained by both Will and Andy 
slips as the (affective) atmosphere in the room becomes openly hostile. Visibly exasperated, 
Andy knocks back Will’s challenge [Andy 3], before tailing off with a theatrical sigh of 
frustration.  As the Researcher’s notes record, the room feels ‘unfriendly’ – a relationally 
affective dynamic – as we appeared locked into (yet another) stalemate, and the Researcher 
  
felt like leaving.  It seems to the Researcher that Andy represents his challenge to the status 
quo as no more than (self evident) ‘best practice’: a ‘discursive grammar’ that denies its own 
contingency, in response to Will’s assertion that he is proposing to swamp people with 
rulebooks.  
-------------------------------------------- 
INSERT EPISODE 2 HERE 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
Episode 2: More sharing of client contacts 
Applying the Logics framework this time to Episode 2, in the first articulation - Disregard of 
contingency: semi-conscious identification/challenge (invocation of political logic) - the 
psychodynamics of Andy and Will’s interaction again appear conditioned by their mutual 
fantasmatic investment in the ‘tinderbox’ of a relationally-felt rivalry.  Such rivalry 
manifested, as usual, in a destructive compulsion towards conflict, as each pursued 
jouissance in the form of the unattainable ontological security of mastery over the other. In 
this exchange, Andy challenges how contacts are normally used [Andy 4] – that is, in ways 
that are sub-optimal from his standpoint – and conjures up a horrific fantasy of the dire 
consequences of maintaining the status quo, presented as normative outcome (‘political’ and 
‘ideological’ dimensions of the Logics). Andy appears genuinely to believe that Associates’ 
use of contacts is objectively sub-optimal (disregard of contingency) – rather than just one of 
several, equally contingent, value choices.  In terms of the Researcher’s own affective 
involvement, his ‘been-here-before/expectant’ notes indicate a sense of expectancy of yet 
another re-opening of old wounds. Revisiting the empirical material, it is inconceivable to the 
Researcher that this affective sense was not shared by all of us, precisely because its shared 
nature was what lent it its intensity. 
  
In the terms advanced here, Andy appears to be unaware of his own fantasmatic 
investment that underlies his proposal of ‘leveraging our contacts better’; Andy would 
frequently make suggestions, such as this, based upon a ‘managerial’ approach to 
administrative control through which, as previously noted, he appeared to gain in confidence 
and a sense of ascendancy. However, if Andy is relatively unaware of the ontological 
contingency of the ontic schema he is advancing, the Researcher is confident that he is semi-
aware that raising the issue of how contacts are used touches on the historical, discursive web 
of relations that has built up between him and Will.  Andy’s/Will’s/the Researcher’s mutual 
emotional investment in this web means that as a result, Andy’s suggestion is not only 
unlikely to go uncontested (political logic) but that, for Will, it will also stir up some horrific 
fantasies. 
In the second articulation - Disregard of contingency: semi-conscious 
identification/challenge (invocation of social logic) - Will appears to sense an attempt in the 
previous articulation by Andy [Andy 4] to normalise social relations around some kind of 
structured communication regime (‘leveraging our contacts across the company’) over which 
Andy will have control. With a grim relish, Will now appears [Will 3] to ‘toy’ with Andy.  
This is apparent from his ‘mischievous’ tone of voice, together with his assessment that, in 
making his ostensibly innocuous suggestion, Andy is proposing that ‘people are just going to 
give up their client relationships’. This is exactly the sort of escalatory behaviour that the 
Researcher would occasionally tell Will or Andy was ‘a bit unnecessary’ (usually on a one to 
one basis, often after a disagreement between them). 
Although Will probably believes in his own discursively stated position (disregard of 
contingency), the Researcher’s reading is that Will’s response is motivated as much by self-
image as by any vigorous opposition to ‘leveraging contacts’ per se. Within the framework 
advanced here, Will is motivated in this exchange by the need to ‘paper over the cracks’ of 
  
his own ontological contingency and to construct/reinforce his own self-image ontically (in 
this instance) as a ‘people person’ by ‘explaining’ to Andy how people are likely to behave 
‘in reality’ (based, perhaps, on his own superior empathy: semi-conscious identification) – 
and casting Andy in an opposing, emotionally unintelligent, role.  Fantasmatic motivation 
towards self-realisation as a ‘people person’ appears to inflect Will’s readiness to broaden the 
debate, which escalates rapidly from Andy’s suggestion about ‘working together’, to a barely 
disguised claim about relative empathy.  Such motivation – jouissance – is apparent to the 
Researcher because there appears to be more going on than a simple discursive argument – 
for which Will’s pursuit of a secure self-image is the most intuitive explanation. 
In response, Andy’s ‘dogged’ advancement of the need for ‘more robust pipeline 
management’ [Andy 5] in the third articulation - Disregard of contingency: semi-conscious 
identification/challenge (defence of political logic) – seems to be akin to a fantasmatic 
‘battening down of hatches’ in response to what Andy will, in the Researcher’s view, 
inevitably interpret as Will’s [Will 3] implied identification of him as a bloodless 
managerialist whom people will not obey simply ‘because they’ve been told to’ (i.e. by 
Andy).  Once again, Andy’s strategy is to invoke ideologically normative ‘best practice’ (see 
Episode 1) in the form of the ‘pipeline’, etc. (‘ideological’ and ‘social’ dimensions).  Visible 
in Andy’s dogged adherence to the ‘grammar’ of his more structured approach to 
organizational management, and associated ascendancy, is once again a strength of emotion 
that transcends the mere (cognitive) articulation of a minor difference in position.  As a 
participant in such exchanges, it seems to the Researcher that their fantasmatic identifications 
lead each party to disregard the contingency inherent in their respective positions. Such 
exchanges are sensed by the Researcher to contain an insecure, and perhaps distinctively 
masculine, posturing element that is ‘all about them’, and not necessarily about Associates, 
that triggers his own feelings of ‘hardening cynicism’.   
  
The final articulation - Regard of contingency: knowing challenge (defence of social 
logic)- implies that the hardening cynicism felt by the Researcher is shared (co-created?) with 
at least Will as he responds with a flat rebuttal.  In the Researcher’s assessment, it is a 
rebuttal underpinned by his self-identification as ‘straight talking’ and ‘reasonable’ (he can 
‘just tell it like it is’, based on his insights as a ‘people person’).  The outcome is an 
underlining of what, from Will’s point of view, is the contingency of Andy’s assertion of 
self-evidence (‘ethical’ and ‘political’ dimensions).  Temporary ‘ontic closure’ is achieved, 
with the preservation of the social logic of status quo – but at the expense of cordiality. The 
existing political settlement has been reproduced – for now.   
What of the Researcher’s own fantasmatic identifications?  Building on the 
confessional observations offered so far, and attempting an ethical reflexivity in the SE 
quadrant of Figure 2, it seems to the Researcher that his own jouissance is bound up in some 
way with his ability to work within Associates and yet maintain his own independence: to be 
‘in it but not of it’. ‘Squaring of the circle’ is evidently as impossible for him as discursive 
mastery of the Other is for Will and Andy. It forms an ulterior source of motivation that pre-
positions him no less than theirs: in this sense, the Researcher is no more ‘in control’ during 
these exchanges than they are. 
 
Discussion 
Shifting analytical focus from ‘ontic’ to ‘ontological’ in practice studies 
In analyses of practice, the significance of affect, in the form of emotions, feelings and 
moods, tends to be backgrounded. Even those who acknowledge the orienting role of affect in 
providing practice with a ‘sense of direction’ (Shotter, 2011: 6) rarely analyse practice from 
within an affectively-informed, critical ontology (see Clough, 2007). To counteract this 
silence, we have suggested the relevance of employing an affect-based ontology of practice 
  
for illuminating the relational, emergent everyday qualities of ‘organizing’.  Affect, we have 
suggested, is of central importance for understanding the animation and reproduction of 
practice - as illustrated by our detailed analyses of the episodes at Associates. These have 
demonstrated how affect-saturated identifications and transient social ‘settlements’ are 
accomplished within evolving, politically charged, social relations with social, political, 
ideological, and ethical dimensions along axes of naturalization and contestation. 
For the directors at Associates, moment-by-moment articulation of their world of 
mutual intelligibility involves (re)production of meaningful, but precarious, ‘settlements’ 
between these four dimensions: in endorsements, ‘gentle testing/questioning’, outright 
challenges, ironic compliance with social structures, and so on. Understanding why such 
settlements occur, and are supplanted with others, requires engagement with an impelling 
dynamic between ostensibly firm ontic ‘structures’ and ontologically fluid, affectively 
charged ‘processes’ upon which the seeming firmness of the ontic register is contingent at all 
times. Unfolding ‘practice’ comprises the generative tension between ontic and ontological 
registers. This dynamic arises from the irreducibility of the ontological to the ontic register, 
or as Laclau (2000: 81) puts it, ‘there is no logical transition from an unavoidable ethical 
[ontological] moment…to any particular [ontic] normative order. There is an ethical 
investment in particular normative orders, but no normative order which is, in and of itself, 
ethical’. 
 
The ethnographic challenge 
A particular issue for further consideration is our proposal of a shift in analytical focus within 
practice studies: from studying phenomena of the ontic register, to studying subjects’ mode of 
engagement within the ontological register, before ‘working outwards’ to consider its ontic 
consequences. It is actors’ mode of engagement with unfolding practices, rather than 
  
unfolding practices themselves, that constitutes the locus of social reproduction and/or 
transformation. With this shift comes a particular ethnographic challenge for ontically-
oriented practice studies that address the (ontological) intentions and psychological states of 
others (recalling Wetherell, 2012).  
Given the relational constitution of affect, researchers are likely to produce more 
confessional accounts of their affective intertwining with their research subjects. Subscribing 
to an affect-based ontology to study social practices invites the incorporation of researchers’ 
emotions, feelings and moods into the study of organizing. Our initial attempt to deploy an 
affect-based ontology to venture ‘ontological explanations for ontic phenomena’ is at best 
exploratory and incomplete. Our hope is that it will stimulate the generation of better, more 
incisive analyses of subjects’ (and researchers’) modes of engagement.  
The approach to the study of affect commended here involves the inductive inference 
of ontological phenomena from ontic data. Drawing such inferences will doubtless trouble 
researchers who regard such interpretive work as unacceptably subjective. Our response to 
this objection is that complying with its demands results in a very narrow and shallow form 
of social science that can make only a limited contribution to our collective self-
understanding. Clearly, there are dangers of claiming that analyses of the kind presented here 
are authoritative, rather than engaging them critically as contributions to an on-going process 
of collective sense-making that has an emancipatory potential.   
 
Towards a politics of affect 
Unpacking social practices requires a critical engagement with the visceral operation of 
power within organisations, including actors’ own complicity in reproducing the relations 
through which they are dominated and oppressed – a characteristic that we foregrounded in 
our analysis of Associates. A particular feature of an affect-based ontology, privileged 
  
throughout this article, is a foregrounding of how actors’ historical immersion in power 
relations conditions their self-identifications. Within the psychoanalytically-informed 
analysis advanced by Logics and applied here, such immersion combines with actors’ pursuit 
of an ultimately unattainable jouissance to offer a (for them) compelling, often destructive 
motivation for behaving in the way that they do.  For Will, the pursuit of jouissance entailed 
fantasmatic subscription to an identity as a ‘people-person’; for Andy, it was pursuit of peer 
recognition as a ‘professional’; for the Researcher, it was an ability to remain ‘semi-detached’ 
from (better than?) the posturing at Associates. All three sought to attain an elusive 
ontological security through subscription to fantasmatic identifications. 
Since identification constitutes a form of domination to the extent that actors are 
affectively complicit in their own acquiescence, increased awareness of their self-
identifications with social structures and practices may hold emancipatory potential (Lok and 
Willmott, 2013) – as well as offering some insulation from Žĭzek’s ‘traumatic effects’ when 
fantasy is ultimately unrealised. Bringing these observations together, we suggest that an 
analytical attentiveness to a ‘politics of affect’ – the mutually constitutive and analytically 
revealing relationship between affect and power in organising - may be a necessary corollary 
for an affective ontology of practice.  
Students of the politics of affect can call upon three particular strengths of the Logics 
framework as demonstrated here.  First and foremost, there is its attentiveness to the 
emergent, generative dialogue between ontological and ontic registers of unfolding practice - 
affording what we contend is a more penetrating account of social reality informed by an 
appreciation of the dialectical interplay of the two registers.  In placing ‘contingency within 
the structure’ at the centre of such analysis, the precariousness (and thus ‘political’ 
contestability) of practices that we routinely reproduce, modify or transform, and take to be 
normal, is underlined. Second, recognition of the underlying precariousness of prevailing 
  
discourses in the workplace by more self-aware employees and managers may encourage 
greater mutual sensitivity to one another’s ‘affective self-investment’ in particular positions, 
challenging entrenched political landscapes within organizations.  Third, our Logics 
incorporates a motivational explanation for affective politics: the central role of fantasy offers 
a plausible account for the differential extents to which, as actors, we are disinclined to 
recognise the radical contingency (broader ontological instability) of ontic practices and 
choices in which we are implicated, a distinction that has untold significance for the 
transformation as well as the reproduction of social realities.  
For example, in their sedimentation of social reality, Will and Andy are seen to engage 
in fantasmatic appeals: to the self-evident good of ‘robust structures’; to the obvious good 
sense of not ‘swamping people with rulebooks’ (Andy 2; Will 2); to the clear need to 
‘leverage our contacts across the company’; and to ‘a robust pipeline management approach’ 
(Andy 4; Andy 5). These appeals, we have suggested, are made in the pursuit of political 
logics (proposals for change) as well as social logics (maintenance of the status quo). Such 
practices arise from affectively–driven identifications, derived from available moral 
grammars.  Ontically, the outcomes-in-process of Will and Andy’s interactions are the result 
of how each rallies, ontologically, around the ideological ‘standards’ with which he 
identifies.   
Thus it might have been comparatively easy for Will to endorse, at least partially or 
passively, Andy’s appeals to ‘robust structures’, ‘leveraged contacts’, and ‘pipeline 
management’ on the grounds that ideas advanced by a fellow board member are deserving of 
some active discussion rather than airy or passive-aggressive dismissal. But Will would then 
have been complicit in concealing the radical contingency of these ideas (bottom left 
quadrant of 3). What makes this highly unlikely, if not impossible, is his ongoing affective 
commitment to constituting his self-identity as ‘straight talking’ and a ‘people person’ – a 
  
commitment which results in him challenging the givenness of Andy’s standards.  It is at 
least arguable that a greater self-awareness of their mutual processes of subjection might have 
enabled both Will and Andy to reach a more empathetic accommodation - an insight of some 
practical potential in engendering greater mutual awareness between organisational actors. 
 
Conclusion 
We have commended and applied the framework provided by Logics of Critical Explanation 
(Glynos and Haworth, 2007; 2008) to analyse an example of the mundane organizational 
work of board deliberations. In doing so, our study has contributed to remedying the 
‘poststructuralist methodological deficit’ identified by Zienkowski (2012: 504): that is, a 
comparative lack of methodologies for studying relationally-conceived phenomena.  More 
specifically, we have sought to develop and apply a methodology for examining the centrality 
of affect in the animation of practice, with the anticipation that future studies will engage 
with it and build upon it.  
In our empirical analysis, we proposed and applied a novel way of presenting and 
analysing detailed ethnographic material within a psychosocial, immanent logic of practice. 
We presented Episodes One and Two of the Associates data in tabular format that presents 
empirical material (‘Text’) in the ontic register alongside an interpretation of the 
configuration of social, political, and fantasmatic logics. We then offered a ‘confessional’ 
explanation of the underlying dynamics of unfolding practice in the ontological register. Our 
intention has been to provide an open as well as plausible analysis of the potency and politics 
of affect within a structured framework.  Since this approach seems to offer a productive way 
of displaying and unpacking the ontic/ontological dialectic of practice, we welcome the 
further development and critical interrogation of empirical work based upon the Logics 
framework.  
  
Our affect-based ontology of practice, and associated methodology, leads us to make 
two recommendations that have significant implications that merit careful consideration.  One 
implication is that research that presently hinges around the structure/agency relationship, for 
example, should be reframed within, and oriented by, the generative dynamic between the 
ontic and the ontological, as theorized and illustrated here.  Whilst we have pointed to some 
of the consequences of such a shift, we suspect that we have hardly scratched the surface.  A 
second, and related, implication is that studies of organizational work, including research into 
the operation of power within organisational practice, may usefully pay closer attention to the 
role of affect in processes of social reproduction and transformation.  In turn, such analysis 
holds out the prospect of deepening analysis of self-regulation, such as governmentality (e.g. 
Foucault, 2010) by incorporating an unfolding sensory apprehension of the immanent 
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Analysis 
Episode 1: Organizational structure 
Text 
 
Configuration of social, 
political and 
fantasmatic Logics (cf. 
Fig 2) 
Andy (1): OK, moving onto the Company Handbook.   
(Tense) 
 
Will (1) [noncommittally]: Mmmmmm. 
 
Andy (2): [Sigh] We just don’t seem to take these things 
seriously here.  There’s no way we’re going to be able to get 
growth by competing with the likes of xxx and xxx unless we 
get some more robust structures in place.  And this includes 
more operational delivery management, more detailed 
internal reporting procedures and business planning at 
manager level, and a company code of practice.  We’re just 
going to come unstuck otherwise – you’ll see.  
(aarrgghhhh) 
Will (2) [tersely]: I’m sorry but you know the way I feel 
about this.  We already have perfectly good processes in 
place; we all want to carry on growing but there’s no way 
we’re going to throw the baby out with the bathwater.  We’re 
not… xxx, and we’re just going to lose that magic if we 
swamp people with rulebooks. 
Andy (3): [Visibly frustrated] Clearly, I’m not proposing 
swamping anyone with rulebooks, Andy, it’s just basic good 
practice.  I really…[sigh]. 
(unfriendly, want to leave) 














Episode 2: More sharing of client contacts 
Text 
 
Configuration of Social, 
Political and 
Fantasmatic Logics (cf. 
Fig 2) 
Andy (4):  We really need to think of a way of leveraging our 
contacts across the company better; working together properly.  
At the ABC supplier briefing, it was obvious that xxx and yyy 
had already spoken to the people in the business – and I know 
for a fact that Jill knows some of those people – I felt really 
foolish.  Things are tightening up, and going forwards our 




Will (3): [mischievously] Mmmm. So what are you proposing?  
You know that we’re a vertically oriented business, really, and 
I don’t think there’s any way that people are just going to give 
up their client relationships to other people without a good 
reason – certainly not because they’ve been told to. 
 
Andy (5): That’s not what I’m suggesting, Will.  [Pause].  
[Doggedly]: We need to get a more robust pipeline 
management approach in place, preferably underpinned with a 
web-based application we can all use from wherever we 
happen to be. 
(Cynicism, hardening) 
 
Will (4): Andy, people just won’t use it. 
(Feels unfriendly) 
 












Figure 1: Four dimensions of social relations (Glynos and Howarth 2007:112), modified 





Figure 2: Four dimensions of social relations (Glynos and Howarth 2007:112), adapted 
to show empirical indicators of different configurations of Logics 
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